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Abstract
For the period 1972-2003 in Ireland we document a persistent decline in traditional
import competing and an expansion in exporting plants, within each sector. Yet, the focus
of this paper is to explore the vertical linkages between exporting plants and the
increasing presence of de novo non-exporting plants within industries during this period.
Based the capabilities approach of Sutton (2007) and the creative destruction model of
Aghion and Howitt (1992) we find evidence that forward dominated backward vertical
linkages, in that innovation in de novo non-exporting plants was a key determinant of
export entry, growth and survival within all sectors, while evidence of backward linkages
are harder to find.2
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I. Introduction
Understanding the process of industrialization in a developing economy requires
an acute awareness of interdependences in productive activities. Linkage effects are an
important spur to industrial development, but the nature of these linkage effects may be
of relevance to the way we design and understand the process of industrialization.
Establishing plants involved in the production of final goods can obviously lead to the
demand induced creation of domestic plants involved in the production of inputs (goods
or services, which may or may not have been supplied initially from abroad).
Hirschmann (1958) describes such a process as backward linkage effects. He also
highlights the fact however, that when an industry develops and generates such effects,
that these may in turn generate forward linkage effects. This occurs as the domestic
production of inputs attracts more new and expands other plants whose production uses
these inputs. In his book, Hirschmann (1958) articulates many reasons why domestic
availability is a “more effective spur to further development” than foreign supply: (i)
important employment and tax gains outside exporting companies; (ii) improved balance
of payments position due to less importing of intermediates; and, (iii) product specific
innovations that would lock in exporters to domestic locations and proliferate further use.
The attractiveness of a rich domestic supply of inputs (goods or services)
naturally depends upon the capabilities of those firms involved. As Sutton (2007, pg. 2)
outlines, “ ... ‘capability’ can be thought of as comprising two elements: a measure of the
maximum quality level that the firm can achieve, and a measure of its cost of production
(productivity) for each product line. It is a firm’s relative capability vis-à-vis its rivals
that will turn out to matter…”.
In this paper, we examine the importance of linkages, especially forward linkage
effects in the development of Irish economic policy since the 1950s, and the subsequent
impact on the industrial development path in Ireland over the period 1972 to 2003.
Ireland in the late 1950s had an industrial base that was cultured on import substitution
industrialization where protectionism for three decades encouraged home-grown firms to
replace imports of final goods by domestic production. This led to the entry of plants with4
low capabilities protected by trade policy.
1 In the late 1950s, the concept of industrial
development changed in emphasis towards export promotion, using financial incentives
and enhanced capabilities to support exporting companies, during trade liberalisation. We
examine the role that the enhanced capabilities of supporting or input firms, established
through industrial policy in the fifties and the sixties, play in the performance of
exporting firms over the last three decades.
The main thrust of this paper is therefore to explore the possibility of vertical
forward linkages within industries, or in other words, the effectiveness of the domestic
supply of intermediate goods to enhance export entry, growth and survival since the
1970s. The following section provides a detailed overview of Ireland’s industrial policy
since the 1950s. Section III provides a description of the data and an analysis of the main
features of Ireland’s development over the period 1972 – 2003. This provides the
motivation for our econometric section (Section IV), where we test for the nature of the
linkages between exporting and non-exporting companies within industries. In particular,
we highlight the role of forward vertical linkages where non-exporting plants and their
capabilities are found to enhance export entry, growth and survival over this period. The
last section outlines the conclusion.
II. A Roadmap of Ireland’s Industrial Policy
Ireland in the late 1950s had an industrial base that was cultured on import
substitution industrialization where protectionism for three decades encouraged home-
grown firms to replace imports by domestic production.
2 This led to the entry of plants
with low capabilities protected by trade policy.
In the late 1950s, the concept of industrial development changed. The emphasis
was on export promotion, using financial incentives and enhanced capabilities to support
exporting companies during trade liberalisation. Seán Lemass, one time Taoiseach of
1 Low capabilities result from a lack of historical product specific sunk cost expenditures (Sutton, 2007).
2Using effective measures of protection, McAleese (1971) documents the variance in the degree of
protection across 4-digit industrial sectors, although protection in all cases was extremely high by
international standards. Before Ireland signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1960
and the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Area Agreement (AIFTA) in 1966, the average effective tariff level was
nearly four times the level observed in trading partners. During the period 1966-1979 (EC entry in 1973
followed by tariff abolition in 1979), effective tariffs were reduced to levels that were twice as high as
trading partners.5
Ireland from 1959 until 1966, and Dr. T. K. Whitaker, a civil servant, are credited for an
inspirational approach to export oriented industrial policy and are regarded by many as
the architects of modern Ireland.
3 Whitaker (2006) gives a great deal of credit to
academic members of the Capital Investment Advisory Committee which included
Professor Louden Ryan. Ryan (1961) read an important paper on investment criteria in
Ireland to members of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland in which
Whitaker was active. Hirschman (1958) was central to the investment criteria that formed
the basis of this paper.
Full tax relief on exports profits was first introduced in 1956.
4 In 1959, the
Encouragement of External Investment Act repealed all previous restrictions on foreign
ownership.
5 The 1969 Industrial Development Act established the modern Industrial
Development Authority (IDA) which came into operation in April 1970. It gave it the
power to deploy the full range of export incentives and support for exporting firms to
foster the national objective of regional industrial development.
Michael J. Killeen (1975), Managing Director of the IDA, outlined the two pillars
of industrial policy to the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland: export
incentives and supports. Alongside export tax relief, capital grants were used to attract
green field export oriented FDI in new industries, and similar incentives were given to
Irish owned export oriented companies that were start-ups.
6 The focus on creating an
exporting base from new capital and locating it outside the traditional Dublin Hub was
very Schumpeterian in its thinking. There was a realisation that the capabilities in
industrial products cultured under protectionism were low, and a shakeout would be
3 Garvin (2004) notes that the protectionist policies adopted by government in 1932 were based on a paper
written by Lemass. Garvin (2004) considers the move away from free trade in the 1930s until 1960 as a
major mistake in terms of Ireland’s human and economic development. In this paper we document the
decline of many import competing companies over the 1970s and early 1980s. This reflects additional costs
of the protectionist era. In fact, if one examines the trend in the share of the Irish domestic market taken by
"competing" imports of manufactured products, one can see only a slow and erratic increase in the market
share of competing imports in the period 1960-67. There was, however, a much more rapid and continuous
increase in the share of competing imports for many years with AIFTA in 1966, EEC entry in 1973 and
tariff abolition in 1978, see Figure 6.2 in O'Malley (1989).
4 Ireland had to abolish the discriminatory export tax relief as a member of the EEC and introduced a flat
ten per cent rate on all manufacturing firms in 1981.
5 Yet, many UK companies traded nominally under Irish Ownership after independence in 1922.
6 Start-up grants could be up to 50 per cent of the cost of machinery and equipment and 100 per cent of
land and buildings (business parks) in designated BMW regions (Border, Midlands, West Regions). In non-
designated regions start-up grants could be up to 33 per cent of the cost of machinery and equipment and 66
per cent of land and buildings.6
imminent.
7 As modelled in Sutton (2007), when quality matters and is an outcome of
many years of product specific sunk cost expenditures, no level of wage adjustment (or
government intervention) can compensate for poor levels of productivity and quality
during the initial stages of trade liberalisation. Not only were the Irish policy makers to
be commended for their forward thinking, in terms of an understanding that capital is not
so mobile or adaptable, but also for actually exercising their political ability to promote
de novo export companies over import competing incumbents with such incentives.
8
In terms of supports Killeen (1975) states “…. we have come to appreciate that
providing the full range of back-up services needed by industry (i.e., in addition to IDA
activities, grants and other incentives) is a complex process which depends on a host of
development agencies working in a planned and synchronised way…..” with respect to
the provision of utilities, planning, banking, marketing and so on. Killeen also
emphasizes the importance of targeting policy to the development of export oriented
service type industries, such as consulting, engineering, computing, and labour market
training as well as Research and Development. This translates into the importance of
building up a rich supply of core capabilities for exporting plants. In addition to the
general equilibrium supports, Killeen (1975) highlights the need for downstream linkages
to exist inside industries as a core capability that Ireland can offer. Apart from
accruement of additional profits and wages, the ability of local companies to embed
themselves in the stages of production (processing, supply chain, or R&D) of a particular
export product line can result in substantial improvements in capabilities (productivity
and quality) of exporting companies leading to their long term presence in Ireland.
9
Thus, in their concept of industrial policy formulated in the late 1950s Lemass
and Whitaker not only anticipated the shakeout of traditional import competing
7 Economic Theory has taken a long time to understand the curse of product specific investments under
protectionism. Roland and Verdier (1999) used such supply-side distortions and disorganisation in the links
of production to model a short-term output contraction after market liberalisation and a recovery thereafter
in countries coming out of planning. Konings and Walsh (1999) provide empirical evidence of this using
firm level data from Ukraine.
8 Repkine and Walsh (1999) explain trends in industrial output of four CEE countries with initial trade
orientation of product lines. Product lines exporting to the CMEA (former Soviet Union) market collapsed
while the smaller EU oriented exporting product lines that existed pre market liberalisation gradually
expanded. This dualism, created by government policies pre-transition, and their subsequent dynamics
created output trends irrespective of government policies post-transition.
9 Sutton (2000, 2004 and 2007) articulates and models this issue.7
manufacturing plants, but they also further understood that export growth would only
happen, however great the financial incentives, if a location could offer core capabilities
to exporting plants. They understood the relationship between non-exporting and
exporting plants would become vertical, and had an acute understanding of the product
specific nature of investment that is needed in supports. While such capabilities are hard
to build they do lock exporting companies into the industrial structure.
To understand how exporting incentives and supports interplay, we focus this
paper on the nature of the intra-industry linkages between exporting and de novo non-
exporting plants within narrowly defined manufacturing sectors. Much has been written
on the role of horizontal backward linkages - from foreign multinational firms to
indigenous firms. Such positive productivity gains could arise from the movement of
trained labour from the foreign to the domestic firm, or competitive pressures which
improve the efficiency of the indigenous firms (see Javorcik 2004 for an overview).
10
vertical backward linkages are modelled in Markusen and Venables (1999) model inter-
firm linkages between multinationals and indigenous suppliers. These are linkages that
arise through contact between domestic suppliers of intermediate goods and their
multinational customers – this is where indigenous suppliers learn superior production
techniques from the multinationals they supply, or benefit from the demand for higher
quality supplies from the multinationals, or benefit from the increased demand for
intermediate goods which allow the indigenous firms to reap scale economies. Blalock
(2001), Schoors and van der Tol (2001), and Javorcik (2004) find evidence of such
positive vertical backward linkages. We test for such horizontal or vertical backward
linkages in our data, but the evidence is far from convincing.
The main thrust of this paper is to explore the possibility of vertical forward
linkages within industries, or in other words, the effectiveness of domestic supply of
intermediate goods or services to enhance entry, growth and survival in export
populations. The capabilities approach of Sutton (2007) and the creative destruction
model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) have the feature that quality innovations are of
paramount importance to endogenous growth. In Aghion and Howitt (1992), the
10 As dictated by industrial policy, the majority of foreign multinationals do not compete with indigenous
firms in local market, but rather use Ireland as export platform (Ruane and Ugur, 2004).8
investment into innovation in intermediate inputs is clearly modelled outside incumbent
companies and will eventually replace the current suppliers of intermediate inputs with
higher quality intermediate inputs.
It is very difficult to measure innovation in supply chains but in this paper we
construct an index from turnover in de novo non-exporting plants that proxies for
innovation rates inside sectors that induces export entry, growth and survival which had
a significant impact on Ireland’s industrial development since the 1970s.
In summary, Lemass and Whitaker were the architects of Irelands export oriented
industrial policy which was seeded back in the late 1950s. The lesson from Ireland’s
industrial development path suggests that import competition can be expected to have a
very damaging impact on industry. Rather than try to restructure or reorient incumbent
import competing plants it could turn out to be a better policy to build an exporting base
from new capital (or from transferred FDI capital) and locate it outside the traditional
hub. This involves managing a massive structural adjustment in employment over many
years.
While it is understood that the local investment environment in a country needs to
be good, regardless of how great the financial incentives are, for export growth, it is less
appreciated that the capabilities of supporting business have to be product specific in a
vertically linked industrial structure. Export growth will only compensate for losses in
import competing companies if a country has capabilities, general and specific, strong
enough to support exporting. Ireland moved from a protectionist era when for three
decades non-exporting home firms tried to replace imports of final goods in the domestic
market. During the next three decades non-exporting home firms were encouraged to
displace imported intermediates with higher quality ones for use in exporting plants. Such
supply side capabilities are often forgotten but are necessary for industry to take
advantage of trade liberalisation.9
III. Data Analysis
(i) The Data
Table 1 summarises the data used in this paper. Our main data source is the
Annual Employment Panel Survey carried out by Forfás over the period 1972 to 2003
covering all manufacturing companies. Although the number of plants in operation in a
given year varies between 4,000 to almost 7,000, the total number of plants tracked in the
data is 27,407. The unit of observation is employment (permanent staff) at the plant level.
These are identified by country of ownership (based on majority ownership Irish, UK,
US, or Other Foreign); Sector (4-digit NACE industry codes); Start-up date; from start-up
date we classify plants as Traditional if set up pre-1973 and De novo if set up 1973 or
later; and, Regional Location (Dublin; Border, Midlands, West (BMW); and, South).
Within all industries there are both exporting and non-exporting plants. Using
trade information for plants in the Forfás annual expenditure survey 1983 - 2003, we
label all plants as Exporting if a plant has any exports over the survey period.
11 For
incumbent plants in 1972 and de novo which exited before 1983, we classify as exporting
or non-exporting using exporting grant information. Exporting is treated as a fixed effect
for the period 1972 – 2003 to control for pre-selection effects.
12
Finally, a foreign versus indigenous dualism has been at the centre of most
research on Irish manufacturing. Irish industrial policy since the 1950s clearly targeted
green field and export-oriented FDI, mainly US companies, to locate in high-technology
4-digit sectors and away from traditional manufacturing. The economic factors that
govern such FDI entry, survival and exit, should be expected to be different to Home
industries. For our analysis we can classify our data into Home and US industries.
13 There
11 The expenditure survey excludes plants with less than 19 employees up to 1999, although they are
included from the year 2000. The annual employment survey generally has the same plant identification
number as the annual expenditure survey. We used phone numbers, address and name to match any
outstanding plants. Based on an analysis of the expenditure survey of all plants in the year 2003 we work
with the assumption that exporting was a rare feature of small plant activity (less than 19 employees) for
the period of our study.
12 There are very few observations where exporters become non-exporters over the period while only 10 per
cent of exporters in the 1983-2003 survey came from non-exporting history. The nature of industrial policy
encouraged exporting from start-up.
13 Plants do not operate in 90 4-digit industries in Ireland. In addition, we find a small number of plants in
another 70 4-digit industries. This has lead researchers to aggregate up to 3-digit industries. Our strategy is
to work with the 4-digit industries that explain 99 per cent of employment in each of the periods between
1972-2003. This excludes 70 small industries and about 300 plants.10
are 43 US industries (i.e. with the majority of jobs in a 4-digit industry being US owned
between 1972 and 2003), and 58 Home industries (i.e. with the majority of jobs in a 4-
digit industry being Irish owned between 1972 and 2003).
14 See Table 2 for this
taxonomy of 4-digit sectors.
15
(ii) Aggregate Manufacturing Employment 1972 – 2003
Figure 1 illustrates a U-shape in manufacturing employment over the period of
analysis. From the final abolition of tariffs against ECC members in 1978, there began a
decline in manufacturing employment which persisted until 1987, from which point it
began to rise once more until 2000. Meanwhile, despite the discrete institutional changes
of AIFTA in 1966, EEC entry in 1973, and the abolishment of tariffs in 1978, we observe
a steady increase in exports as a share of both output (Figure 2), alongside a persistent but
gradual rise in labour productivity in manufacturing (Figure 3) over the entire period. In
aggregate, the high value added export oriented production that replaced traditional home
oriented production was less employment intensive leading initially to a decline in overall
employment.
A simple way to explain the U-shape in manufacturing employment is to point to
a dominance in the collapse of indigenous import competing manufacturing, due to
gradual import penetration, from 1966 up to 1987 (see O’Malley 1989) with the slow
progression of US FDI plants up to 1987 and boom there after (see Barry 1999). We feel
that this is too simplistic. In the next section, we highlight the contribution of indigenous
exporting plants (traditional and de novo) and the capabilities created by de novo Irish
non-exporting plants that supported exporting plants across all industries whether
dominated by indigenous or US exporters.
16
14 Each sector has either a majority of Irish owned or majority of US owned plants in terms of their
contribution to sector employment. While clearly there are UK and other non-US Foreign owned plants,
these do not aggregate up to a majority in any sector.
15 We observe foreign owned plants in 4-digit Home industries and both home and ‘other foreign’
ownership in US industries. With regard to Home industries, many UK and European companies were once
Irish owned, but the managers of this data set always backdated ownership structure to the most recent. In
US 4-digit industries plant ownership structure did not change much over time.
16 Walsh and Whelan (2000) did not have trade data at the plant level. They did provide indirect evidence
that 3-digit industry growth was linked to plant turnover and the gradual development of 6-digit exporting
product clusters within industries.11
(iii) The Role of Exporting in Manufacturing Trends
Beneath the U-shape in manufacturing employment, Figures 4 (i) and (ii)
illustrate the trends by trade orientation and firm type for both Home and US industries
respectively. The collapse of non-exporting (particularly in those sectors dominated by
Home ownership) alongside the expansion of exporting (particularly in those sectors
dominated by US ownership) over the period of analysis is evident. Within Home
industries, the collapse of traditional non-exporting plants is very evident in Figure 4 (i).
These plants did not switch into exporting, but rather were phased out.
17 Although 80,000
jobs were lost in traditional non-exporting plants, the overall employment in Home
industries only declined by 25,000. This is due to the success of traditional exporters and
the emergence of de novo exporters and small Irish business over this time period.
Turning to US industries in Figure 4 (ii), we observe 80,000 new jobs created by
de novo exporters over the period. Traditional plants mostly stayed for the entire period,
maintaining their employment levels, while small non-exporting plants clustered around
the export activities of multinationals. The initial US FDI base was gradually developed
over this period to create employment levels in the late 1990s exceeding those observed
in Home industries.
The story of Irish Manufacturing over this period is not simply about the loss of
80,000 jobs in traditional import competing plants and the generation of 80,000 jobs in de
novo US FDI plants. Capabilities in traditional exporters in both Irish and US dominated
industries were good and we intend to show that de novo non-exporters in Irish and US
dominated industries increased the capabilities of exporters in these industries to become
a world leader in manufacturing.
(iv) Plant Size, Entry, Growth, Survival
Within all sectors, for both Home and US industries, we have exporting and non-
exporting plants, traditional and de novo plants, Irish and Foreign owned plants. Table 3
17 Timing, location and product issues go against the idea that de novo exporting plants came from
traditional non-exporting plants. There is a time lag between the collapse of traditional non-exporting and
the expansion of de novo plants. In addition, de novo plants tended to locate outside Dublin in designated
areas. Finally, we will document a large inter-industry reallocation over time, suggesting that product lines
were abandoned.12
presents a summary of plant numbers in the data within Home and US industries,
averaged over four groupings of time to reflect the broad business cycles of the economy.
We observe exporting plants to be fewer in number, bigger in employment size
and older compared with non-exporting plants. On average, exporting plants have
positive growth in each and every period up to 2000 but declines thereafter. Traditional
exporting plants, cultured with industrial policy under a protectionist regime, have
impressive survival rates, with 72 per cent surviving the entire period in Home industries
and 78 per cent in FDI industries. US plants were not footloose.
Traditional non-exporting plants, cultured under a protectionist regime, have
extremely poor growth and survival rates over the entire period, with just 26 per cent
surviving in Home and 20 per cent in US industries.
In contrast, we see that the mass entry of de novo non-exporters are, on average,
very small (under 10 employees) and young (due to turnover) Irish plants with positive
growth rates over the entire period. De novo non-exporting plants became an interesting
feature of industries over time. It is very likely that the stock of small de novo non-
exporters emerged to support the capabilities of exporting plants within the same
industries. We test for such vertical linkages in our empirical section.
(v) Location Characteristics of the Data
Table 4 describes the regional dimension of the data within Home and US
industries. Meyler and Strobl (2000) detail regional industrial policy in Ireland back to
the late 1950s. We observe that most of the de novo activity of exporters and non-
exporters has put jobs into BMW and Southern regions away from the traditional
manufacturing hub. The fact that de novo non-exporting plants locate in designated
export regions is another reason to test for vertical linkages between exporters and de
novo non-exporting plants.
(vi) An Analysis of Aggregate Employment Flows
In order to fully understand the dynamics of manufacturing employment flows,
we apply the indices developed in Davis and Haltwinger (1992) to compute annual job
creation rates JC (a weighted sum of the growth rates of all expanding plants i), job13
destruction rates JD (a weighted sum of the absolute growth rates of all declining plants




















We do this by both Home and US classifications of manufacturing j. The annual
net change (NET) in aggregate employment, the rate of job turnover across plants (TO),
and the reallocation of employment between plants is (REALLOC) for each subsection of
manufacturing j (j = Home or US) is calculated as:
jt jt jt jt
jt jt jt
jt jt jt







REALLOC shows the percentage of jobs in different plants at the end of the year
compared to the start of a year, net of the business cycle – or the simultaneous expansion
and contraction of plant employment net of the cycle.
A similar analysis is done by Lawless and Murphy (2008). Table 5 documents the
net cycle and job reallocation rates within the pool of jobs in Home and US industries.
We also do some annual job turnover accounting to see the percentage contribution of
inter- and intra-sector flows (the contribution of the aggregate cycle is the omitted
residual) in job turnover.
18
Taking the aggregate cycle in Home industries we observe the aggregate cycle
explains only, on average, 15 per cent of plant experience. Due to ongoing entry,
expansion, contraction and exit at each point in the aggregate cycle we see job
reallocation rates across plants in the region of 15 per cent in each and every year.
18 Inter-sector job reallocation within Home and US industries j is measured by summing growth rates at
the 4-digit sector level s rather than the plant level i.in equation (1). The corresponding reallocation rate in
equation (2) would then measure reallocation due to the simultaneous expansion and contraction of 4-digit
sector employment at the same point in the aggregate cycle. Having the aggregate cycle and the inter-
industry reallocation rate, the intra-industry reallocation rate is simply the residual in annual job turnover
created by plants.14
Structural change in the plant population is ongoing, irrespective of the business cycle. In
addition this structural change seems to be mostly within sector, on average 68 per cent.
Taking the aggregate cycle in US Industries we observe growth in most of the time
periods. Yet the aggregate cycle explains, on average, only 20 per cent of the plant
experience. Intra-sector structural change accounted for 55 per cent of the overall job
turnover within US dominated industries.
In Table 6 we set out to examine job flows by plant type (exporting, non-
exporting, traditional and de novo plants) averaging over four blocks of time to reflect the
four broad business cycles in the Irish economy. Traditional non-exporting plants (fewer
in US industries) are seen to have a poor performance over the entire period. De novo
non-exporting plants reveal positive net growth rates alongside large plant turnover over
the entire period. Exporters are a smaller group of plants with low turnover generating net
gains. Overall, even though we observe heterogeneity within plants grouped by such
characteristics, on average, trade orientation (trade and industrial policies) seem to have
greatly affected the net job flows within 4-digit Home and US industries during this
period.
(vii) Plant Turnover and Numbers
A key feature of this paper is the role that de novo non-exporters play in the
performance of exporters within a sector. We have seen that the mass entry of de novo
non-exporters are, on average, very small (under 10 employees) Irish plants with positive
growth rates and that they tend to locate in designated export regions. Table 7 (i) gives us
the total plant numbers by plant type and Table 7 (ii) decomposes total plant turnover by
plant type. De novo non-exporting plants accounts for an overwhelming proportion of
plant turnover and over time account for most of the plant numbers. In the next section
we will test whether such renewal of the vertical links of production within sectors can
explain export growth.
Summary
The story of Irish manufacturing since the 1970s is far more than a simultaneous
collapse of indigenous import competing manufacturing in the face of trade liberalisation
alongside the gradual expansion of US FDI plants. While traditional non-exporting plants15
had extremely poor growth and survival rates over the period of analysis, traditional (and
de novo) exporting plants did extremely well in terms of their growth and survival. De
novo non-exporting plants, though small, gravitated toward designated export locations,
have positive growth, and account for most of the total plant turnover in manufacturing.
We feel that such non-exporting activity has greatly enhanced capabilities for exporting
within vertically linked industrial structures.
In what follows we first empirically test for the presence of inter-firm linkages
within sectors. We first test for backward linkages and test whether the accumulation rate
of exporters in a sector determines non-exporter performance in terms of entry, growth,
and survival. Yet the main focus of the paper empirically tests for the presence of forward
linkages. As motivated in Aghion and Howitt (1992), we will show that development of
de novo non-exporting plants in terms of accumulation (innovation) rates is a key driver
of exporter capabilities within sectors in terms of entry, growth, and survival.
IV Empirical Analysis
i) Backward Linkages
Acquiring external capital and technology is an importance channel for firms to
increase their profits and productivity level. Therefore, many previous studies argue that
the capital stock provided by downstream firms can be vitally important for growth
upstream. In this section, we test the existence of backward linkages between non–
exporters and exporters in Irish manufacturing.
Most studies employ a Cobb – Douglas production function to estimate backward
linkages within industries. The capital stock is usually measured by total output
(employment) of downstream firms normalized by total output (employment) of upstream
firms (e.g., Blalock, 2001; Javorick, 2004; Liu and Lin, 2004). We augment this approach
by assuming that every time an exporter innovates it increases employment. Historical
innovations depreciate with age. The stock of innovation is represented by employment
size Eit in an exporter discounted by age. The possible backward linkage effect is
captured by the aggregated stock of export innovations divided by the number of non-
exporting companies, Nj, in the sector k. We control for vertical backward linkages from




























If we wished to test for horizontal linkages between exporters we would use the number
of exporters within a sector or the number of all plants of the sector in examining the
exporter effects on overall development among non-exporters and exporters. δ denotes
the depreciation rate. The backward linkage effects are tested for with in 4-digit sectors.
We impose δ = 0.01 for the capital stock provided by exporters. As Nadiri and Prucha
(1996) point out, it is not surprising to see that choosing an arbitrary depreciation rate
turns out to be the popular strategy for constructing capital stock in applied work.
Measuring the depreciation rate poses a challenge, which arises partly from the properties
of intangible assets and partly from the lack of data on asset depreciation. In addition, the
depreciation rate applied to exporters is much lower than that applied to non–exporters (δ
= 0.05), which reflects the low turnover and reallocation effect of exporters.
We model the year–to–year employment growth rate of plants. The key plant
level characteristics are initial start–up size, age, ownership and region dummies.
Moreover, we include industry and time dummies to account for the effect of the omitted
variables, such as the business cycle. We estimate the impact of exporters’ sector capital
stock on plant level non–exporters’ growth and survival to examine possible vertical
backward linkages, and on plant level exporters’ growth and survival to examine
horizontal linkages. In addition, we also estimate the impact to the growth and survival
of all plants and examine the effect of the presence of exporters to the overall
development within sector. The regressions are run on a split sample of plants across
Home or US industries over the period 1973 – 2003. We expect that the disaggregated
firm–level panel data combining with long time span will provide robust results.
Assuming a random selection process, we write down the basic regression model
as the following:
  1 , , ,   kt j jt jto jt Linkage Ownership Age Size f g (4)
where employment growth, gjt, as in equation (1) is a discrete measure of a non-exporting
plant j growth that varies year to year with: employment size in year zero Sizejto, life17
cycle Agejt.,ownership (Irish, UK, US or Other) Ownershipj, and dummies for region, 4-
digit sectors and year dummies.
19 Vertical Backward linkages, Linkagek,t-1, are measured
by equation (3). Note that we take one year lag of backward effects as an explanatory
variable. On the one hand, the linkages via technology transfer and setup of supply chain
cannot take place immediately and lag of backward effects play important role in the
development of manufacturing (e.g., Liu and Lin, 2004); on the other hand, we use it to
control for endogeneity, which stems from the ex ante industry growth (e.g., Stancik,
2007). Do firms with a bigger presence of exporting firms have a positive effect on the
growth and/or survival of non-exporting plants? This looks for evidence of backward
linkages (Vertical) within sectors of Irish manufacturing. It is easy to look for horizontal
backward linkages by augmenting equation (3) and using plant level data on exporting
firms only. One could augment equation (3) to talk account of the full population of firms
and look for mixed backward linkages on all the plants in the sector.
The random selection model depends strongly on the fact that the exit process or
the probability of plant survival is not related to any of the explanatory variables. Yet as
outlined, the literature to date finds that plant failure rates decline with initial size and
age. This sample selection bias can overstate the marginal impact of our explanatory
variables. Correcting for such a sample selection bias can theoretically change the sign,
magnitude or significance of the relationships found in the non-failing regression. The
Wald test is used to reject the reported employment growth model that assumes a random
selection process.
The unusually long time span of this panel data set allows one to test and control
for sample selection in a very effective way. We employ the Heckman (1979) full
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The Heckman lambda is computed for each observation in the selected non-
failing non-exporting sample and the following regression models the contributions of
19 The results are similar if one uses a continuous measure of growth.18
our explanatory variables to the expected growth rate of non-failing non-exporting
plants:
  jt k j jt ijo Z jt Linkage Ownership Age Size f g
i
 , , ,
1 
 (6)
where jtis Heckman’s lambda.
The impact of start-up size on the employment growth while controlling for the
business cycle, the life cycle, probability of survival and backward linkages, amongst
other factors, is motivated by the failure of Gibrat’s Law of Proportionate effect.
20 The
failure of Gibrat´s law is motivated by the Jovanovic (1982) theory of firm selection and
industry evolution under ex-ante uncertainty concerning the ex-post performance of
firms.
21 There is substantial evidence that growth is negatively related to size and age
across industries and time (Hall, 1987; Wagner, 1992; Mata, 1994; and Audretsch, 1995).
As in earlier studies of the literature we find the likelihood of plants surviving
being positively related to size and age within 4-digit industries: (Mansfield, 1962; Hall,
1987; Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989; Audretsch, 1991 and Audretsch and
Mahmood, 1995). This has been confirmed for other countries including Portugal (Mata,
Portugal and Guimaraes, 1994; Mata, 1994), Germany (Wagner, 1992) and Canada
(Baldwin and Gorecki, 1991; Baldwin, 1995; and Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman, 1995). We
find that while the rate of plant failure declines with age and size, the same is also true for
employment growth rates of non-failing plants. The expected growth rate of plants
depends on the net effect of these two forces. In addition strong non-linearities can be
expected in the relationship between non-failing employment growth and size and it
motivates us to include the square and cube of log of plant initial size as explanatory
variables. Identification comes from regional dummies (policies) that seem to increase
survival but do not enhance plant growth.
20 If surviving small firms, even after controlling for their probability of survival, grow faster than large
firms, Gibrat’s (1931) Law of Proportionate effect is deemed to fail. For a comprehensive review of this
literature, see Sutton (1997). This Law states that the expected value of the increment to a firm’s size in
each period is proportional to the current size of the firm. Hence, proportionate growth rates are
independent of firm size.
21 Extensions of Jovanovic (1982) can be found in Hopenhayn (1992) and Ericson and Pakes (1995)19
Firm entry is also an important aspect of efficiency. We employ a logit model to
test the impact of a sectors exporters’ capital stock on the entry rate of non–exporters
(exporters or the entire plant population) into a sector:
 
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On the one hand, the presence of exporters may provide more non-exporting entry
opportunities via supply chain, technology absorption, or providing public goods; on the
other, it may limit market share and increase the entry difficulty for potential entrants by
importing.
22
In Table 8 we present the test results for the impact of backward linkages of
exporters innovation rates within a sector on plant level non–exporters but also on
exporters only and all plants. Generally speaking, the backward linkages are not clear and
the effects depend on the choice of plant sub–sample. When all plants in the data are
included into the sample, backward spillovers have negative and significant effects on
both growth and survival. This effect mainly comes from US industries, in which the
presence of exporters will significantly decrease the growth and survival possibility of
non-exporting plants.
Regression results of the impact exporters at the sector level on the growth,
survival, and entry of exporters are presented in the third row, which reflects the
horizontal linkages. The sector capital stock scale provided by exporters does not affect
exporting plant growth and survival, except that it induces positive survival across Home
industries. However, the presence of exporters can induce more entries of exporting
plants in both Home and US. Barry, Gorg and Strobl (2003) argue that investors may
exhibit a tendency to imitate each other’s choice due to uncertainty. Since exporters face
greater uncertainty, they may interpret the presence of existing exporting plants as a
positive signal of the investment attractiveness. Moreover, clustering may bring about
22 One problem with this type of regression is that the trade orientation at the plant level could be picking
out better plants through an endogenous selection process. However, the nature of Irish industrial policy
encouraged exporting from start-up. There are very few observations where exporters become non-
exporters over the period while only 10 per cent of exporters in the 1983-2003 survey came from a non-
exporting history. Segmentation and a control for pre-selection histories of exporters help circumvent a
potential endogenous switching from non-exporting to exporting bias.20
knowledge and technology spillover, the increasing availability of specialised labour and
a growing pool of specialised input providers. Krugman and Venables (1995) and
Venables (1995, 1996) model firms, which are linked through production inputs, may
tend to agglomerate geographically.
ii) Forward Linkages
The evidence for backward linkages is not that strong. The capabilities approach
of Sutton (2007) and the creative destruction model of Aghion and Howitt (1992)
highlight the role of quality innovation in intermediates in endogenous growth. We
already saw in our descriptive analysis that the non-exporting base changed dramatically
during this period. While exporters mainly grew and survived, we see a clear out of the
inherited non-exporting base being replaced by a larger number of smaller plants with
high turnover rates. De novo non-exporting plants became an interesting feature of
industries over time. Though small, these plants gravitate toward designated export
regions, have positive growth, and account for most of the total plant turnover in
manufacturing. It is very likely that the stock of small de novo non-exporters provided the
source of core capabilities and innovations to support the exporting plants within the
same industries. Therefore, we highlight the role of de novo non–exporting plants in the
formation of new capitals and innovations and model the forward linkage effect as
follows. Every time a non-exporter innovates it increases employment. Again historical
innovations depreciate with age. The stock of innovation is represented by employment
size Ejt in a non-exporter discounted by age. The possible forward linkage is captured by
the aggregated stock of non-export innovations divided by the number of exporting
companies, Ni, in the sector k. We control for vertical forward linkages from non-




























The forward linkage effects are within 4–digit sectors. As mentioned, we impose δ = 0.05
as the depreciation rate of the capital stock in the population of de novo non-exporters
investments, which reflects the large reallocation and high turnover in the data.21
In Figure 5, we plot the trends of our forward linkage effect and actual data on
outsourcing to Irish companies used by exporting plants, for Home, US, and all industries.
Irish outsourcing includes raw material and services provided by domestic suppliers to
support exporting plants. The highly positive relations in all three graphs show that our
new innovation rate cumulated by de novo non–exporting plants is positively related to
the intermediate inputs requirement of exporting plants, which provides evidence that we
are controlling for vertical linkages. Görg and Ruane (2000), building on McAleese and
McDonald (1978) and O'Farrell and O'Loughlin (1981), used outsourcing information
from the expenditure survey to model backward vertical linkages of exporters
(multinationals). The expenditure survey only covers large companies for the 1980s and
1990s. Our employment survey has the full population of firms and let’s us look at inter-
firm linkages, non-exporting and exporting firms, in more detail.
To test for forward vertical linkages we employ the same estimation procedures as
in (5), (6) and (7) with the linkage effect defined in terms of equation (8) and we test for
its impact upon exporting plants information, i’s , when we want evidence of forward
vertical linkages. We estimate the impact of de novo non–exporters stock of innovation at
the sector level on three aspects of exporting plants: growth, survival, and entry of
exporters to examine vertical forward linkages, non–exporting plants to examine
horizontal linkages, and of all plants to examine the influence upon manufacturing as a
whole. In the meanwhile, we run the regressions on plants of Home industries, US
industries, and whole Irish Manufacturing, respectively, and look for the evidence of
forward linkages (Horizontal or Vertical) within sectors of each sub–sample.
Table 9 shows the test results of forward linkage effects on exporters, non –
exporters and all plants in manufacturing, respectively. As shown in the first row, when
both exporters and non–exporters are included, overall forward spillovers have positive
effects on the performance of manufacturing, especially as it significantly induces more
entry of new plants. The positive effects are much clearer across US industries and the
coefficients on all three prospects are positive and significant. US industries usually have
higher technology level and exporting share and are more productive, which implies that
the new capital from de novo non–exporters are orientated to support high technology
and exporting firms.22
Of key interest in the results is the existence of vertical forward linkage, that is,
the impact of the presence of de novo non-exporters on the performance of exporters. As
shown in the second row, the forward linkage effects are positive and significant on all
prospects: growth, survival, and entry of exporters across Home industries, US industries,
and all industries in manufacturing. It indicates that the supply chain capability and
innovation by small indigenous suppliers of intermediate inputs are of paramount
importance to the performance of exporting firms. As in Aghion and Howitt (1992),
innovations are undertaken in a least cost manner via the entry and exit of firms or by
changes in ownership, rather than through product innovation within incumbent firms.
With trade liberalisation and the horizontal waves of creative destruction (a decline in
traditional import competing plants and an expansion in exporting plants) within each
sector, there coexisted vertical waves of creative destruction in de novo non-exporting
plants. The presence of de novo plants has a positive effect on the performance of
exporting plants, which accounts for the growth within a defined sector.
Moreover, positive horizontal linkages are found and coefficients on the growth
and survival of non – exporters across all sectors are significantly positive. This mainly
comes from positive linkages to growth and survival of non–exporters across Home
industries and survival of non–exporters across US industries. And it also indicates that
technology transfer dominates competition in those aspects.
IV Conclusion
This paper highlights the role of small business supports (alongside capital grants
and tax relief) that targeted exporting start-ups since the late 1950s and created a
traditional Home or a US dominated exporting base within all 4-digit industries during
the last decades of protectionism. In their concept of industrial policy formulated in the
late 1950s, Lemass and Whitaker wanted to create an exporting base from new capital
and locate it outside the traditional Dublin hub. This policy realised that the capabilities
in industrial products cultured under protectionism, was low, and a shakeout would be
imminent. As modelled in Sutton (2007), when quality matters and is an outcome of
many years of product specific sunk cost expenditures, no level of wage adjustment can
compensate for poor levels of productivity and quality. They understand that capital
cultured under protectionism may not be so mobile or adaptable. Industrial policy23
aggressively promoted de novo export companies (including FDI) over import competing
incumbents. The collapse of traditional non-exporting plants is shown to be very severe.
These plants did not switch into exporting, but rather were gradually phased out.
Eventually, the losses were more than recuperated by exporting activities outside the
traditional hub after 1987.
Lemass and Whitaker not only anticipated the shakeout of traditional import
competing manufacturing plants but they understood that export growth would not
happen, no matter how great the financial incentives, if a location could not offer core
capabilities to exporting plants via small business supports. They understood that
relationship between non-exporting and exporting plants could become vertical and were
aware of these opportunities that were presented in Hirschmann (1958). To understand
how exporting incentives and supports interplay we focus on the nature of the intra-
industry linkages between exporting and de novo non-exporting plants within narrowly
defined manufacturing sectors. This paper tested for the role that backward linkages
played in determining firm entry, growth and survival within sectors. There is little
evidence of vertical backward linkages but we find some evidence of horizontal
backward linkages between exporters in the same industry. Our main focus is on the
existence of vertical forward linkages within industries. We empirically investigate the
hypothesis that supplies and innovations by small indigenous suppliers of intermediate
inputs are of paramount importance to the performance of exporting plants in US and
Home industries. The capabilities approach of Sutton (2007) and the creative destruction
model of Aghion and Howitt (1992) have the feature that product specific quality
innovations are central to endogenous growth.
Ongoing vertical waves of creative destruction in de novo non-exporting plants
are shown to support export entry, growth and survival within sectors. Ongoing
innovation in supply chains puts the state of Ireland’s human capital and technology
central to the successful building up of an export oriented industrial base. Local supply
side capabilities are needed to exploit the opportunities offered by trade liberalization.
This aspect of Ireland’s industrial policy is highlighted in this paper.24
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Table 1 : Data Summary
Annual Employment Panel Survey carried out by Forfás over the period 1972 to 2003, covering all
manufacturing companies.
Plant Throughput: 27,407 plants.
Employment: Number of permanent staff at the plant level
Sectors: 4-digit NACE 1993 REV.1 (Nomenclature of Economic Activities in the European Union).
Ownership Dummies: Endpoint Majority (>50%) Ownership. Four types Irish, UK, US and other
Foreign.
US Industries (US Dummy): =1, if the majority (>50%) of jobs in a 4-digit sector are US owned
between 1972-2003 (43 sectors) and zero otherwise (58 sectors).
Start-up date: Actual Year of Incorporation.
Start-up size: For entry post 1972 employment in the first year and for entry pre 1972 employment in
1972.
Export Dummy: Exporting Plant =1 if the plant exports any amount using the Annual Expenditure
Survey 1983-2003, zero otherwise. For incumbent plants in 1972 and new entrants during 1972-1982
that exited before 1983, with > 19 employees, we tagged using grant information. Exporting is treated
as a fixed effect for the period 1972-2003 to control for pre-selection effects.
Traditional Firm Dummy: Traditional Plant = 1 if born before 1973, zero otherwise.
Region Dummies: Dublin, South, Border, Midlands and West regions.
Dublin Employment Dummy: Dublin Employment Dummy=1 if majority (comparing the other areas)
of jobs in a 4-digit sector come from Dublin.
West Employment Dummy: West Employment Dummy=1 if majority (comparing the other areas) of
jobs in a 4-digit sector come from west area.
Plant Turnover Rate: Plant Turnover Rate induced by all entry and exit in each year.30
Table 2: Sector Share of Total Employment in 2003
Nace Description of Sectors Share
HOME INDUSTRIES
1500 food products 0.32%
1511 Production and preserving of meat 4.76%
1512 production And preserving of Poultry meat 0.04%
1513 Production of meat and poultrymeat products 0.61%
1520 Processing and preserving of fish and fish products 1.05%
1533 Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables n.e.c. 0.91%
1551 Operation of dairies and cheese making 4.64%
1561 grain mill products 0.79%
1571 prepared feeds for farm animals 0.94%
1581 bread; fresh pastry goods and cakes 2.50%
1598 Production of mineral waters and soft drinks 1.32%
1722 Woollen-type weaving 0.90%
1740 made-up textile articles except apparel 1.06%
1754 other textiles n.e.c. 0.25%
1820 other wearing apparel and accessories 4.42%
1822 other outerwear 0.71%
1910 Tanning and dressing of leather 0.47%
1920 luggage handbags and the like saddlery and harness 0.14%
1930 footwear 0.98%
2010 Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood 0.95%
2030 Builders carpentry and joinery 1.05%
2040 wooden containers 0.12%
2051 other products of wood 0.37%
2112 paper and paperboard 0.93%
2125 other articles of paper and paperboard n.e.c. 0.16%
2213 Publishing of journals and periodicals 1.33%
2222 Printing n.e.c. 2.86%
2224 Composition and plate-making 0.16%
2320 refined petroleum products 0.14%
2420 pesticides and other agro-chemical products 0.51%
2524 other plastic products 2.52%
2610 glass and glass products 1.47%
2611 flat glass 0.09%
2621 ceramic household and ornamental articles 0.50%
2640 bricks tiles and construction products in baked clay 0.40%
2651 cement 0.33%
2661 concrete products for construction purposes 2.43%
2670 Cutting shaping and finishing of stone 0.48%
2682 other non-metallic mineral products n.e.c. 0.56%
2743 Lead zinc and tin production 0.08%
2800 Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipment 0.08%31
2811 metal structures and parts of structures 1.52%
2812 Builders carpentry and joinery of metal 0.30%
2822 central heating radiators and boilers 0.22%
2851 Treatment and coating of metals 0.09%
2862 tools 0.25%
2870 other fabricated metal products 0.11%
2873 wire products 0.20%
2875 other fabricated metal products n.e.c. 4.07%
2920 other general purpose machinery 0.15%
2932 other agricultural and forestry machinery 0.66%
3410 motor vehicles 0.86%
3420 bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; trailers and semi-trailers 0.35%
3511 Building and repairing of ships 0.55%
3610 Manufacture of Furniture 0.11%
3612 office and shop furniture 0.24%
3614 other furniture 1.98%
3663 Other manufacturing n.e.c. 0.78%
Nace Description of Sectors Share
US INDUSTRIES
1583 Sugar 0.77%
1584 cocoa; chocolate and sugar confectionery 1.37%
1589 other food products n.e.c. 1.27%
1591 distilled potable alcoholic beverages 0.64%
1594 cider and other fruit wines 0.02%
1596 Beer 1.56%
1600 tobacco products 0.76%
1710 Preparation and spinning of textile fibres 0.12%
1711 Preparation and spinning of cotton-type fibres 0.56%
1751 carpets and rugs 0.85%
1772 knitted and crocheted pullovers cardigans and similar articles 1.69%
1823 Underwear 0.44%
2020 veneer sheets; plywood laminboard particle board fibre board and other panels an 0.28%
2415 fertilizers and nitrogen compounds 0.53%
2430 paints varnishes and similar coatings printing ink and mastics 0.43%
2442 pharmaceutical preparations 3.65%
2452 perfumes and toilet preparations 0.75%
2466 other chemical products n.e.c. 1.12%
2470 man-made fibres 0.66%
2513 other rubber products 0.81%
2681 Production of abrasive products 0.16%
2710 basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (ECSC)1 0.07%
2840 Forging pressing stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metallurgy 0.28%
2924 other general purpose machinery n.e.c. 1.38%
2952 machinery for mining quarrying and construction 0.61%32
2953 machinery for food beverage and tobacco processing 0.39%
2956 other special purpose machinery n.e.c. 0.26%
2971 electric domestic appliances 1.15%
3002 computers and other information processing equipment 4.37%
3110 electric motors generators and transformers 1.20%
3130 insulated wire and cable 0.95%
3150 lighting equipment and electric lamps 0.36%
3162 other electrical equipment n.e.c. 1.46%
3220 television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line tele 1.82%
3230 television and radio receivers sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus 0.82%
3310 medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 3.41%
3320 instruments and appliances for measuring checking testing navigating and other p 0.89%
3340 optical instruments and photographic equipment 0.69%
3430 parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines 2.70%
3530 aircraft and spacecraft 1.29%
3622 jewellery and related articles n.e.c. 0.47%
3650 games and toys 0.33%
3662 brooms and brushes 0.16%33
Table 3: Summary Statistics of the Data


















Total 3776 39 0.012 7.6 989 72 0.043 8.7
Exporting 597 86 0.043 15.2 299 155 0.066 11.8
Irish Traditional 388 91 0.016 28 70 74 0.010 21.8
Irish De Novo 112 40 0.452 2.5 25 59 0.085 2.4
FDI Traditional 72 139 0.011 17.5 121 257 0.015 18.6
FDI De Novo 25 71 0.190 2.3 82 100 0.618 2.5
Non-Exporting 3179 30 -0.003 4.4 691 36 -0.001 5.8
Irish Traditional 2271 30 -0.029 17.7 407 30 -0.061 8.4
Irish De Novo 657 12 0.440 2.2 146 18 0.291 2.3
FDI Traditional 182 92 -0.069 14.3 89 85 -0.048 18.1
FDI De Novo 70 48 0.308 2.3 49 43 0.556 2.5
1980-1987
Total 4946 25 -0.045 6.9 1553 53 -0.001 7.5
Exporting 902 66 0.004 12.9 523 125 0.022 11.3
Irish Traditional 377 83 -0.038 35.7 69 75 -0.022 29.3
Irish De Novo 364 36 0.103 5.8 104 33 0.106 5.1
FDI Traditional 70 119 -0.058 24.8 119 251 -0.028 25.8
FDI De Novo 91 77 0.112 5.4 231 118 0.081 6.3
Non-Exporting 4044 16 -0.088 5.4 1030 17 -0.080 5.2
Irish Traditional 1579 24 -0.122 25.2 269 20 -0.147 15.7
Irish De Novo 2281 8 0.030 4.9 605 8 0.043 4.3
FDI Traditional 78 75 -0.209 21.6 48 61 -0.206 26.7
FDI De Novo 107 29 -0.121 4.9 107 39 -0.037 5.3
1988-1997
Total 4619 23 0.003 10.9 1796 54 0.036 10.7
Exporting 1145 57 0.018 15.4 721 119 0.041 14.4
Irish Traditional 331 76 -0.011 44.6 60 77 -0.004 38.3
Irish De Novo 631 41 0.064 10.3 217 40 0.083 9.2
FDI Traditional 47 103 -0.043 32.8 109 234 -0.017 34
FDI De Novo 136 74 0.014 10.1 335 141 0.070 11.1
Non-Exporting 3473 11 -0.022 9.3 1075 11 -0.004 8.1
Irish Traditional 883 19 -0.050 35.2 135 13 -0.105 23.8
Irish De Novo 2480 8 0.011 9 822 7 0.010 7.5
FDI Traditional 28 47 -0.082 27 26 35 -0.047 39.4
FDI De Novo 83 19 -0.062 9.4 93 37 0.035 9
1998-2003
Total 4145 27 -0.006 15.5 1819 67 0.001 14.1
Exporting 1218 59 -0.013 19.6 822 132 -0.005 17.6
Irish Traditional 296 75 -0.033 52.3 54 76 -0.035 46.2
Irish De Novo 747 47 0.008 15.1 300 42 0.006 12.7
FDI Traditional 34 103 -0.042 40.8 95 218 -0.028 41.3
FDI De Novo 141 74 -0.028 15.2 374 191 0.002 15.1
Non-Exporting 2927 13 0.006 13.7 997 14 0.035 11.2
Irish Traditional 615 22 -0.022 44.2 82 12 -0.041 25.6
Irish De Novo 2243 11 0.026 13.4 811 9 0.054 10.8
FDI Traditional 16 52 -0.049 37.1 18 32 -0.132 46.3
FDI De Novo 54 19 -0.018 13.4 87 56 0.040 10.934
Table 4: Employment Structure of Home and US Industries: Dublin, BMW and
South.
1972 1987 1997 2000 2003
WITHIN TRADITIONAL4-DIGIT
INDUSTRIES
OVERALLEMPLOYMENT 140084 106548 109323 113540 105421
Dublin % 36 26 23 22 21
Traditional Exporters % 11 10 8 7 6
De novo Exporters % 5 7 7 6
Traditional Non-Exporters % 25 7 3 3 3
De novo Non-Exporters % 4 5 5 5
BMW and South % 64 74 77 78 79
Traditional Exporters % 19 21 18 16 16
De novo Exporters % 20 33 34 35
Traditional Non-Exporters % 45 17 11 10 10
De novo Non-Exporters % 16 16 17 19
WITHIN US-DIGITINDUSTRIES
OVERALLEMPLOYMENT 60559 81133 115757 131450 115469
Dublin % 48 29 23 25 22
Traditional Exporters % 30 16 9 9 9
De novo Exporters % 7 11 10 9
Traditional Non-Exporters % 18 3 1 1 0.5
De novo Non-Exporters % 2 2 5 3
BMW and South % 52 71 77 75 78
Traditional Exporters % 29 21 14 11 10
De novo Exporters % 39 56 57 58
Traditional Non-Exporters % 22 23 1 1 0.5
De novo Non-Exporters % 8 7 7 935
Table 5 : Job Flows in Home and US industries:
Net Employment Growth, Reallocation Rates, % of Turnover that is Inter- and Intra-
sector (and by default, that is due to the net cycle)
Home Industries US Industries
Year NET REALLOC % INTER % INTRA NET REALLOC % INTER % INTRA
1973 7.4 5.7 2.4 41.3 9.1 4.0 9.5 25.0
1974 1.6 10.7 45.1 52.9 1.2 13.0 45.3 48.0
1975 -4.3 11.6 8.6 62.3 -1.1 17.1 42.0 51.0
1976 0.1 16.3 35.2 64.6 4.1 13.9 36.4 40.6
1977 1.8 15.5 19.2 69.6 5.8 11.8 18.5 48.9
1978 1.8 12.4 15.3 70.1 5.1 10.6 23.6 41.8
1979 2.9 12.8 19.0 64.3 6.8 9.2 11.2 45.9
1980 -5.3 13.6 9.7 62.6 1.9 16.2 40.0 48.2
1981 -3.0 15.8 20.1 62.2 1.3 14.3 38.3 53.8
1982 -4.6 12.9 7.2 64.0 0.6 15.5 35.3 59.9
1983 -6.6 13.9 9.4 56.0 -2.9 16.7 25.6 59.5
1984 -2.6 17.2 22.8 61.2 0.0 18.7 39.5 59.9
1985 -3.4 16.0 18.8 61.3 -1.3 15.5 32.8 58.8
1986 -3.1 17.2 10.6 71.4 0.2 14.1 34.7 64.4
1987 -4.2 16.5 15.2 62.0 -0.6 14.0 32.7 62.9
1988 -1.0 18.3 24.8 68.1 4.1 11.2 21.5 51.9
1989 0.9 18.2 31.4 64.5 4.7 10.6 18.6 49.6
1990 0.7 15.7 27.7 67.7 2.7 14.3 18.6 64.2
1991 -2.2 15.5 23.2 65.0 1.5 13.7 26.5 63.2
1992 -1.9 15.4 18.0 70.2 1.4 13.9 24.3 66.2
1993 -1.4 15.2 22.4 68.4 2.2 13.8 20.7 65.0
1994 1.5 14.1 19.4 71.4 2.9 13.9 22.8 59.5
1995 2.0 14.1 23.7 63.5 5.4 11.5 21.4 46.2
1996 1.8 14.1 24.5 63.7 4.3 12.6 29.3 44.4
1997 2.6 13.0 22.1 60.7 5.3 10.3 22.4 42.8
1998 1.7 13.5 21.8 66.8 2.6 13.9 21.6 61.6
1999 0.9 15.9 33.8 60.7 5.8 14.1 32.4 53.3
2000 1.1 16.0 34.2 59.2 7.2 12.0 19.5 42.3
2001 -1.7 14.0 26.9 62.3 -5.2 15.0 32.6 43.6
2002 -3.0 14.6 22.0 60.7 -4.1 13.3 23.5 52.3
2003 -2.6 13.7 25.3 58.2 -3.7 11.4 22.5 51.436
Table 6: Home and US Industries Flows
Home, Yearly Average 1973-1979 1980-1987 1988-1997 1998-2003
OVERALL
Job Creation Rate 8.0 7.7 8.6 7.9
Job Destruction Rate 7.3 11.8 8.3 8.5
Net 0.7 -4.1 0.3 -0.6
EXPORTERS BY FIRM TYPE
Traditional Exporters Job Creation Rate 1.6 1.1 1.3 1
Traditional Exporters Job Destruction Rate 1.3 2.4 1.8 1.8
Traditional Exporters Net 0.3 -1.3 -0.5 -0.8
De novo Exporters Job Creation Rate 1.0 2.4 3.7 3.4
De novo Exporters Job Destruction Rate 0.2 0.9 2.0 3.4
De Novo Exporters Net 0.9 1.5 1.6 0.0
NON-EXPORTERS BYFIRM TYPE
Traditional Non-Exporters Job Creation Rate 2.9 1.1 0.7 0.7
Traditional Non-Exporters Job Destruction Rate 5.2 5.6 1.7 1.0
Traditional Non-Exporters Net -2.4 -4.5 -1.0 -0.3
De novo Non-Exporters Job Creation Rate 2.5 3.1 2.9 2.7
De novo Non-Exporters Job Destruction Rate 0.6 2.9 2.8 2.2
De Novo Non-Exporters Net 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.5
US, Yearly Average 1973-1979 1980-1987 1988-1997 1998-2003
OVERALL
Job Creation Rate 10.3 8.3 9.8 8.5
Job Destruction Rate 6.5 8.4 6.3 9.2
Net 3.6 -0.1 3.5 -0.6
EXPORTERS BY FIRM TYPE
Traditional Exporters Job Creation Rate 3.0 1.3 1.3 0.9
Traditional Exporters Job Destruction Rate 2.2 2.5 1.7 1.4
Traditional Exporters Net 0.7 -1.1 -0.4 -0.5
De novo Exporters Job Creation Rate 3.9 4.6 6.7 5.8
De novo Exporters Job Destruction Rate 0.3 1.8 2.7 6.3
De Novo Exporters Net 3.6 2.8 4.0 -0.5
NON-EXPORTERS BYFIRM TYPE
Traditional Non-Exporters Job Creation Rate 1.4 0.3 0.1 0.0
Traditional Non-Exporters Job Destruction Rate 2.9 2.1 0.4 0.2
Traditional Non-Exporters Net -1.5 -1.8 -0.3 -0.1
De novo Non-Exporters Job Creation Rate 2.0 2.1 1.6 1.8
De novo Non-Exporters Contraction Rate 0.5 2.0 1.5 1.4
De Novo Non-Exporters Net 1.3 0.1 0.1 0.537
Table 7(i): Plant Numbers by Firm Type
Traditional De novo Traditional De novo Total
Non-Export Non-Export Export Export
1973 | 3,316 254 653 75 4,298
1974 | 3,213 444 652 25 4,434
1975 | 3,078 585 650 166 4,479
1976 | 2,947 775 651 219 4,592
1977 | 2,808 1,131 650 301 4,890
1978 | 2,691 1,449 651 380 5,171
1979 | 2,585 1,812 651 448 5,496
1980 | 2,479 2,194 651 525 5,849
1981 | 2,335 2,554 651 613 6,153
1982 | 2,189 2,820 650 671 6,330
1983 | 2,025 3,017 645 736 6,423
1984 | 1,886 3,307 638 827 6,658
1985 | 1,757 3,536 625 917 6,835
1986 | 1,606 3,630 617 988 6,841
1987 | 1,510 3,746 598 1,049 6,903
1988 | 1,397 3,747 588 1,111 6,843
1989 | 1,306 3,733 576 1,163 6,778
1990 | 1,221 3,653 564 1,221 6,659
1991 | 1,146 3,554 555 1,246 6,501
1992 | 1,089 3,411 547 1,301 6,348
1993 | 1,014 3,391 539 1,344 6,288
1994 | 957 3,345 534 1,385 6,221
1995 | 903 3,336 529 1,433 6,201
1996 | 868 3,313 521 1,477 6,179
1997 | 818 3,284 514 1,516 6,132
1998 | 790 3,264 507 1,583 6,144
1999 | 776 3,260 497 1,584 6,117
2000 | 753 3,254 486 1,591 6,084
2001 | 724 3,174 473 1,572 5,943
2002 | 679 3,112 461 1,542 5,794
2003 | 656 3,102 445 1,497 5,70038














1973 0.088 19.3% 65.4% 0.3% 15.0%
1974 0.085 28.8% 58.4% 0.3% 12.5%
1975 0.086 35.0% 56.1% 0.3% 8.6%
1976 0.099 32.1% 57.5% 0.0% 10.4%
1977 0.134 23.6% 65.3% 0.0% 11.1%
1978 0.124 20.1% 68.8% 0.0% 11.0%
1979 0.122 17.6% 73.8% 0.0% 8.6%
1980 0.126 16.3% 73.9% 0.0% 9.8%
1981 0.144 18.2% 72.1% 0.0% 9.7%
1982 0.123 20.4% 72.8% 0.0% 6.8%
1983 0.139 20.4% 73.3% 0.6% 5.7%
1984 0.150 15.2% 77.0% 0.8% 7.0%
1985 0.171 12.8% 77.6% 1.3% 8.4%
1986 0.175 14.0% 77.9% 0.7% 7.4%
1987 0.156 10.1% 80.0% 2.1% 7.8%
1988 0.168 11.0% 81.6% 1.0% 6.4%
1989 0.136 11.1% 80.4% 1.5% 7.0%
1990 0.115 11.8% 76.3% 1.8% 10.0%
1991 0.118 10.9% 82.2% 1.2% 5.7%
1992 0.119 8.9% 79.0% 1.2% 10.9%
1993 0.128 10.9% 79.7% 1.2% 8.2%
1994 0.096 11.2% 75.8% 1.0% 12.0%
1995 0.112 9.3% 79.0% 0.9% 10.8%
1996 0.092 7.5% 77.8% 1.1% 13.5%
1997 0.097 9.9% 74.8% 1.0% 14.3%
1998 0.080 7.3% 73.8% 1.0% 17.9%
1999 0.058 4.9% 72.9% 2.5% 19.7%
2000 0.078 5.8% 78.2% 2.1% 13.9%
2001 0.078 8.0% 72.4% 2.9% 16.6%
2002 0.088 10.2% 71.8% 1.9% 16.1%
2003 0.062 7.8% 70.8% 4.6% 16.7%39
Table 8 Empirical Results for the Backward Linkages from Exporter presence in a
sector to plant level Growth, Survival, and Entry of Non – exporters, Exporters,
and All Plants in the Manufacturing.
All Plants in Both Home
and US
Home US





































































































Table 9 Empirical Results for the Backward Linkages from De-Novo Non-Exporter
presence in a sector to plant level Growth, Survival, and Entry of Non – exporters,
Exporters, and All Plants in the Manufacturing.
All Plants in Both Home
and US
Home US






























































































































































































































Figure 3: Labour Productivity (Output per Worker)
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Employment in Home Industries
Year
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Employment in US Industries
Year
Traditional Exporters De Novo exporters
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